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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the
coordination of fiscal policies in the EMU. Results show that the coordination is an efficient
tool to increase EMU stabilization, even though the overall impact greatly varies according to
the nature of the shock that occurs. Fiscal coordination appears to be compatible with the
SGP and coordination gains can actually be enhanced with the SGP. Nethertheless, results
are closely related to the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on output.
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Since EMU members have abandoned national monetary and exchange rate
policies as adjustment mechanisms, they have been looking for other ways to pro-
tect themselves from shocks. It is usually admitted that this role should be assigned
to ﬁscal policies. A solution usually advanced is the coordination of ﬁscal policies.
Policy coordination is based on the idea that individual policies, aﬀect one another,
should take objectives and actions. Partial neglect of these interdependencies would
lead to sub-optimal outcome of policies (Issing, 2002). Policy-makers could then im-
prove this outcome by agreeing on the joint setting of their instruments and thereby
getting closer to their own preferred policy choices. This idea used by Mundell-
Fleming models analyze welfare gains of moving from a non-cooperative equilibrium
towards cooperative equilibrium (Kletzer, 1997; Engwerda and al., 2002).
However, the Stabilily and Growth Pact (SGP) introduces a set of ﬁscal strin-
gency requirements on national ﬁscal policies. The SGP is an agreement among
EMU members to adhere to medium-term budgetary positions close to balance or
in surplus. For Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), “the essence of the Stability and Growth
Pact is to watch the ﬁscal deﬁcit of each member country closed, and punish those,
whose deﬁcits are excessive”. It results a conﬂict between ﬁscal ﬂexibility and ﬁscal
stringency.
We therefore propose to study the SGP eﬀects on ﬁscal policies coordination
within the EMU and show how it aﬀects macroeconomic adjustment. The paper is
organized as follows: Section 2 develops the analytical framework, Section 3 presents
the solution method, Section 4 presents a numerical simulation of the model, and
the ﬁnal section concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
The model is an extension of the model developped by Schalck (2006). It
is a static model of closed monetary union with two countries i and j in which
we introduce a demand shock1. Demand is given by classical terms of literature
(Buti and al., 2002): public deﬁcit (d), common interest rate (r), and trade balance
include intra-EU competitiveness (deﬁned of inﬂation diﬀerential) and diﬀerences in
economic situations. Demand shock x has a σ2
x variance. Demand can be written
1We consider only demand shocks because the eﬃciency of ﬁscal policy to counter supply shocks
is still being widely debated (Brunila and al., 2002).
1as follows:
yi = γdi − ρr + η(yj − yi)+ηε(πj − πi)+xi (1a)
yj = γdj − ρr − η(yj − yi) − ηε(πj − πi)+xj (1b)
where y represents GDP, γ demand sensibility to public deﬁcit, ρ demand sen-
sibility to interest rate, η countries’ relative openness, ε trade balance elasticity to
the inﬂation diﬀerential, π inﬂation rate. Variables are in logarithms and expressed
as deviations from their long-run non-inﬂationary equilibrium. All the parameters
are positive.
Because of nominal rigidities, output and prices can diverge from their equilib-
rium values in the short run. This situation is rendered using a Phillips curve as
supply function (Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2002):
πi = θyi + η(πj − πi)( 2 a )
πj = θyj − η(πj − πi)( 2 b )
We assume that the European Central Bank (ECB), uses the interest rate as the
tool for conducting its monetary policy. The aim of monetary policy is to minimize
a linear-quadratic loss function (LM) which depends on average values. Price sta-
bility is the main objective of the single monetary policy. The implications are that
inﬂation is more heavily weighted in the loss function than other variables. That
results in low values of β1 and β2 (β1 < 1; β2 < 1) which respectively capture the
relative preferences for output stabilization and interest rate smoothing. It must be
noted that an extra term has been added to the interest rate in the loss function
compare to traditional models. The simulations run on monetary policy rules in-
deed show that optimal rules lead to excessive interest rate volatility, although this
situation is not due to the Central Bank’s behaviour. The solution then consists to
include the interest rate in the loss function (Rudebush and Svensson, 1998). The










The behaviour of each government in the monetary union is described by a
linear-quadratic loss function (LG) which depends on its output deviation of the
baseline, its rate of inﬂation with a weight φ1, and its public deﬁcit with a weight
φ2. We consider that the main objective of governments is output stabilisation,
which results in low values of φ1 and φ2 (φ1 < 1; φ2 < 1). The SGP is modelized
by a quadratic contract with a ﬁnancial penalty f.T h e ﬁscal loss functions can































In the cooperative case, ﬁscal policies are deﬁned jointly order to maximise col-
lective welfare. In others words, cooperation ﬁscal policies are conducting in mini-









Supply and demand functions determine output:
yi = γdi − ρr + Ωγ(dj − di)+( 1− Ω)xi + Ωxj (6a)
yj = γdj − ρr − Ωγ(dj − di)+( 1− Ω)xj + Ωxi (6b)
In an equivalent manner, the supply and demand functions determine inﬂation :
πi = θγdi − θρr + θγ(Ω + µ)(dj − di)+θ(1 − (Ω + µ))xi +( Ω + µ)xj (7a)










Parameters Ω and µ can be interpreted as the trade balance on output and
prices. Both economies are connected by a number of channels through which price
and output ﬂuctuations spread across the two EMU member countries.
3 Model Solving
3.1 Solution method
We consider that governments internalize the Central Bank’s behaviour when
making their own decisions. Indeed, if they take for granted the single monetary
policy’s commitment to maintain price stability, the alignment of expectations will
be enhanced and behaviour conditioned in a way which will lead to implicit co-
ordinated policy outcomes, while concurrently limiting policy conﬂicts and overall
economic uncertainty (Issing, 2002). In order to modelize this situation we use a
Stakelberg game in which governments are the leaders and the ECB the follower.
Firstly, each government makes its own decision, it also accepts the other govern-
ments’ behaviours as given and takes accounts ECB’s reaction function. Then the
ECB makes decision considering the governments’ decisions as given. The resolution
of such a game is made by backward induction.
33.2 Interest rate determination
The interest rate is determined by the ECB’s behaviour. We deﬁne the interest
rate by minimizing monetary loss function :






The interest rate rises with the average amount of public deﬁcit. Consequently
monetary policy depends on ﬁscal policy, which means ﬁnancial eviction does occur.
The interest rate also depends on demand shocks. The interest rate sensibility is
mainly determined by monetary function weights (β1,β2) and demand sensibility to
interest rate (ρ).
3.3 Key variables
Expressing the interest rate allo w su st od e t e r m i n eo u t p u ta n di n ﬂation only
with public deﬁcits and the shock:
yi = adi + bdj + cxi + exj (9a)
yj = adj + bdi + cxj + exi (9b)
πi = θ(a − γµ)di + θ(b + γµ)dj + θ(c − µ)xi + θ(e + µ)xj (10a)
πi = θ(a − γµ)di + θ(b + γµ)dj + θ(c − µ)xi + θ(e + µ)xj (10b)
with a = γ − ργΩ b = γΩ − ργψ c =1− Ω − γψ e = Ω − ρψ
Parameter a capture the net impact of ﬁscal deﬁcit on output. This impact
depends on the sensibility of demand to public deﬁcit (γ), interest rate (ργψ)a n d
trade balance (Ω). Parameter b is the ﬁscal externality depending on the eﬀect on
the interest rate and the trade balance. Parameters c and e capture shock’s impact
on output and inﬂation, reduced by economic interdependences and monetary policy.
Macroeconomic equilibria are issued by minimising ﬁscal loss functions. This
methodology allows to compare diﬀerent situations : the non-cooperative and coop-
erative cases, and the SGP’s impact on equilibria.
4N u m e r i c a l S i m u l a t i o n
4.1 Calibration
We consider that stabilization consists in reducing shocks’ impacts on key
macroeconomic variables (output and inﬂation) and therefore on welfare losses. We
4study ﬁscal stabilization within the model when a negative, symmetric or asym-
metric, shock occurs (1% of GDP). The sensibility of demand to public deﬁcit is
suggested by Bouthevillain and al. (2001). Penalty value f corresponds to the vari-
able part of the Pact’s ﬁnancial sanction, i.e. a tenth of the ﬁscal overrun. The
other parameters are issued from Engwerda and al. (2002). The set of parameters
is given in Table I.
Table I. Parameter Values
γρ η εθ β 1 β2 φ1 φ2 f
0 . 7 50 . 20 . 40 . 50 . 2 50 . 20 . 2 50 . 50 . 2 50 . 1
The set of parameters above allows us to determine foreign trade inﬂuence (Ω
and µ), sensibility to the interest rate (ψ) public deﬁcit impact on output (a), ﬁscal
externality (b)a n ds h o c k ’ si m p a c t s( c and e). These parameters are gathered in
Table II.
Table II. Impact Parameter Values
Ω µ ψ abce
0.2305 0.1198 0.1798 0.5232 0.1190 0.6975 0.1586
4.2 Results
In order to study the SGP eﬀect on ﬁscal coordination, we consider two scenarii:
a basic scenario where ﬁscal policies are free (scenario 1), and a scenario where the
SGP is introduced (scenario 2). We compare results issued from a non-cooperatice
case (Non Coop) and from a cooperative case (Coop). Public deﬁcits, outputs, inﬂa-
tions and welfare losses are simulated for each scenario and for each case. Simulation
results can be found in Tables III.
Table IIIa. Symmetric shock results
Scenari dyπ LC LGC
Non Coop i 0.7728 -0.3600 -0.0900 0.2829
1 j 0.7728 -0.3600 -0.0900 0.2929 0.2829
Coop i 0.8397 -0.3170 -0.0793 0.2699
j 0.8397 -0.3170 -0.0793 0.2699 0.2699
Non Coop i 0.6615 -0.4314 -0.1078 0.3451
2 j 0.6615 -0.4314 -0.1078 0.3451 0.3451
Coop i 0.7313 -0.3866 -0.0966 0.3313
j 0.7313 -0.3866 -0.0996 0.3313 0.3313
5Table IIIb. Asymmetric shock (in country i) results
Scenari dyπ LC LGC
Non Coop i 0.6842 -0.3279 -0.0652 0.2282
1 j 0.0985 -0.0257 -0.0232 0.0084 0.1183
Coop i 0.6941 -0.3156 -0.0611 0.2164
j 0.1548 -0.0050 -0.0166 0.0062 0.1113
Non Coop i 0.5741 -0.3855 -0.0771 0.2746
2 j 0.0974 -0.0393 -0.0291 0.0103 0.1425
Coop i 0.5892 -0.3711 -0.0727 0.2618
j 0.1521 -0.0089 -0.0224 0.0084 0.1351
As a result, we can see that the SGP increases larger short-run output ﬂuctua-
tions. The ﬁscal stringency criteria reduce the degree of ﬁscal policy activism and
thereby the degree of eﬀective stabilization of output and prices in the EMU. From
that perspective, the constraints cause suboptimal macroeconomic policies. This
result conforms the study of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995). Their simulations
indicate that a reduction in national ﬁscal stabilizers could lead to a noticeable
increase in the variance of output.
The study also show that coordination of ﬁscal policies is an eﬀective tool to
increase EMU stabilization. Given the degree of economic interdependence in the
EU (through Ω et µ), externalities from national ﬁscal policies exist (synthetized by
b). Coordination of national ﬁscal policies enables the internalization of these exter-
nalities and consequently leads to improve macroeconomic performance compared
to non-cooperative policy. Indeed, output and inﬂation reactions to a demand shock
are weaker in the cooperative than in a non-cooperative case. The shock’s nature
generate diﬀerent coordination mechanisms. When a symmetric shock occurs, both
countries increase their ﬁscal actvism to stabilize both economies. When an asym-
metric shock occurs (in country i for example), country j applies a more activism
ﬁscal policy to counteract the negative impact of shock on its economy, and to con-
tribute to stabilization of the economy of country i. It results that coordination is
more proﬁtable for country j than for country i.
An interesting result is that ﬁscal coordination is compatible with the SGP. Even
if a ﬁscal contraint exists, ﬁscal coordination improves macroeconomic performance.
This is true for all cases. Moreover, we can see that coordination gains, i.e. diﬀerence
between non-cooperative welfare losses and cooperative welfare losses, are larger
when the SGP is introduced than when ﬁscal policies are unconstrained. In these
conditions, coordination of ﬁscal policies appears as the preferable response towards
European stabilization.
64.3 Sensibility studies
In order to test the strength of our issues, we make sensibility studies for some
key parameters of ﬁscal coordination: sensibility to deﬁcit (γ), sensibility to interest
rate (ρ) ,t h ep e n a l t yv a l u e( f).
The simulation shows that welfare losses are decrease functions of γ values, i.e.
losses are low when sensibility to deﬁcit is high (Fig 1). This issue corresponds
t ot h ee c o n o m i ci n t u i t i o n :ﬁscal stabilization is strong when ﬁscal multiplyers are
high. Coordination gains increase with the sensiblity value but there is a threshold
beyond which gains decrease: it correspond to 0.43 if ﬁscal policies are free and
to 0.52 if ﬁscal policies are constrained. An interesting result is that coordination
gains with the SGP can be larger than those obtained when ﬁscal policies are free.
This situation occurs when the sensibility value is over 0.48. The EMU situation
corresponds to this braket and then conﬁrms the assumption that coordination is
compatible with the SGP.
Figure 1: Fig 1. Sensibility to public deﬁcit and ﬁscal coordination: The
solid line refers to free ﬁscal policy case and the line with plus sign refers to SGP
case.
The second parameter which can modify coordination issues is the impact of
monetary policy. Indeed, sensibility to interest rate depends on ﬁscal policies in
member countries and on demand shock. Insofar as governments internalize the
Central Bank’s behaviour, impact parameter values (a,b,c and e)d e p e n do nt h e
7interest rate and therefore depend on sensibility to the interest rate. It results
that the higher the sensibility, the weaker impact parameters values and the weaker
impacts’ shock on welfare. Welfare losses are decrease functions of sensibility to
the interest rate (Fig 2). Same as for sensibility to public deﬁcit, coordination
gains with the SGP are larger than those obtained when the ﬁscal policies are free.
Nethertheless these gains decrease with the sensibility to interest rate value and
become nil beyond ρ =0 . 8 9 .
Figure 2: Fig 2. Sensibility to interest rate and ﬁscal coordination: The
solid line refers to free ﬁscal policy case and the line with plus sign refers to SGP
case.
The last parameter that we have tested is the penalty value. This parameter
does not aﬀect welfare losses and coordination gains when ﬁscal policies are free,
but aﬀect them when the SGP is introduced. Insofar as ﬁscal stringency implies
larger short-run output ﬂuctuations, welfare losses are increase functions of penalty
value (Fig 3). Coordination gains increase with the penalty value but there is a
threshold beyond which gains decrease: it corresponds to f =0 . 5 0 . T h eﬁscal
activism has a larger welfare cost and is less eﬃcient.
8Figure 3: Fig 3. Penalty value and ﬁscal coordination: the line with plus sign
refers to SGP case.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The objective of this paper is to study the impact of the SGP coordination of
ﬁscal policies in EMU. We used a static model of closed monetary union and we
compared non-cooperative and cooperative cases in terms of stabilization perfor-
mance.
Results show that coordination is an eﬃcient tool to increase EMU, but the
eﬀects vary according to the shock’s nature. Fiscal coordination is compatible with
t h eS G Pa n dc o o r d i n a t i o ng a i n sc a nb el a r g e rw i t ht h eS G Pu n d e rc o n d i t i o n s .
These conditions are the eﬀects of monetary anf ﬁscal policies on output. EMU is
the situation in which the SGP is preferable. In these conditions the SGP is an
optimal ﬁscal rule: it can aim at both ﬁscal discipline and stabilization.
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